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CHILD CUSTODY IN KENTUCKY DIVORCE CASES: 1940-1952
One of the most tragic aspects of divorce is its effect upon children
of the marriage. It is a difficult ordeal for the principals, but it is much
easier for them to bear in their maturity than it is for young children.
The children will feel the results of the divorce throughout their formative years in that they must be placed in custody of one of the two
parents, or both, or in the care of a relative, or even in the care of a
third person. In any case the status of the children will be abnormal
when compared with that of children of successful marriages. While
any custody disposition might have an undesirable effect on a senstive
child, an award to an improper guardian may have a disastrous effect
upon even a hardy child. Obviously the responsibility of the chancellor in determining the custody disposition of a child is a most grave
one, incapable of perfect solution even after he has carefully considered all relevant factors and weighed them minutely.
In Kentucky since 1940 the Court of Appeals has considered approximately eighty divorce cases in which custody was in issue. Some
were original appeals, while others were appeals from divorce cases
redocketed for the purpose of reconsidering the custody decree. As
would be expected, the great majority of these cases occurred after
the end of World War II. During the entire period almost an equal
number of divorce cases appeared before the court wherein the report
discloses that there had been a custody award which was uncontested.
It would be difficult to estimate how many more custody dispositions
were made in divorce cases which were never appealed. Each divorce
decree concerning custody will involve at least one child and often
two or more children. It is apparent that since 1940 divorce custody
decrees have affected a significant proportion of Kentucky's youthful
population. It is imperative for the welfare of the children involved
that the courts be properly apprised of all relevant facts in each case
in order that they can arrive at the best decision possible under the
circumstances.
The determination of a custody problem involves a field of law
and human relations which does not lend itself to any standard
formula-each case must be determined largely on its own facts. To
what, then, does the court look in solving these problems? First and
primarily it seems that the court will consider the character and
morality of the parents. If it appears that either displays any character
aberration such as drunkeness, drug addiction, uncontrollable violent
temper, general dissipation, or the like,' or that either is immoral or
'Goodwin v. Goodwin, 296 Ky. 835, 178 S.W. 2d 214 (1944) (father a
drunkard); West v. West, 294 Ky. 301, 171 S.W. 2d 453 (1943) (father a
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unchaste, 2 that parent will be deemed unfit to care for the child, and
an award will be made to the other parent if it appears from the record that he or she is fit. If it seems that both parents have questionable
characters or morals the court will have to make a comparative analysis
of the two, and award custody to the parent who will have the least
deleterious effect upon the child. If it appears that both are clearly
unfit the court will look elsewhere to lodge custody: either to a grand3
parent, or other relative, or even a stranger.
If both parents seem to be equally fit, in most, if not all, cases the
mother will be given the custody of young children of "tender years",
and also of girls of any age. 4 The age of "tender years" seems to include the years from birth until the age of eight or nineY The court
will hear the expressed preference of a child which has reached an age
of discretion and will give it "weight" 6 but such preference will not
bind the court and it will be overruled if the court is of the opinion
that the circumstances of the case indicate a contrary disposition. 7
However, children of sixteen years and older may be allowed absolutely to make their own selection. 8 A mother will be given the custody
of younger children even when it appears that she is guilty of a single
and isolated instance of immorality or unchastity. If it is but an incident of her past history the court will give her grace to reform; 9 if she
shiftless drunkard and a habitual criminal); Finley v. Finley, 8 Ky. Law Rep. 605,
2 S.W. 554 (1887) (mother a drug addict); Charles v. Charles, 246 S.W. 2d 161,
(Ky. 1952) (father had outrageous temper and threatened lives of wife and
children); Lester v. Lester, 296 Ky. 691, 178 S.W. 2d 423 (1944) (father had a
violent temper); Tackett v. Tackett, 302 Ky. 611, 194 S.W. 2d 832 (1946)
Sfather shiftless); Aubrey v. Aubrey, 303 Ky. 534, 198 S.W. 2d 209 (1946)
mother gambled and a writer of cold checks); Stafford v. Stafford, 287 Ky. 804,
155 S.W. 2d 220 (1941) (father inconsiderate of children).
'McGill v. Coomer, 309 Ky. 703, 218 S.W. 2d 947 (1949); Philpot v. Philpot, 300 Ky. 114, 188 S.W. 2d 107 (1945); Cole v. Cole, 299 Ky. 319, 185 S.W.
2d 382 (1945); Reynolds v. Harris, 297 Ky. 206, 179 S.W. 2d 880 (1944);
Perkins v. Perkins, 291 Ky. 571, 165 S.W. 2d 152 (1942) Cf. Napier v. Napier,
286 Ky. 452, 151 S.W. 2d 72 (1941).
"See Davis v. Davis, 289 Ky. 618, 159 S.W. 2d 999 (1942).
'Bartley v. Bartley, 310 Ky. 332, 220 S.W. 2d 850 (1949); Perkins v. Perkins,
291 Ky. 571, 165 S.W. 2d 152 (1942); DAvis v. DAvis, 289 Ky. 618, 159 S.W.
2d 999 (1942); Stafford v. Stafford, 287 Ky. 804, 155 S.W. 2d 220 (1941);
Sowders v. Sowders, 286 Ky. 269, 150 S.W. 2d 903 (1941); Travis v. Travis, 282
Ky. 215, 138 S.W. 2d 336 (1940).
ISee Mitts v. Mitts, 312 Ky. 854, 229 S.W. 2d 958 (1950); also Lawson v.
Mitts, 247 S.W. 2d 382 (Ky. 1952).
'Wright v. Thomas, 306 Ky. 768, 766, 216 S.W. 2d 315 (1948); Horn v.
Dresohel, 298 Ky. 427, 183 S.W. 2d 22 (1944); Gray v. Gray, 295 Ky. 91, 174
S.W. 2d 16 (1943); Varney v. Trout, 232 Ky. 513, 23 S.W. 2d 944 (1930);
Cummins v. Bird, 230 Ky. 296, 19 S.W. 2d 959 (1929).
"Bowman v. Bowman, 313 Ky. 806, 233 S.W. 2d 1020 (1950); Wright v.
Thomas, 306 Ky. 763, 209 S.W. 2d 315 (1948).
'Stamper v. Stamper, 309 Ky. 161, 216 S.W. 2d 936 (1949).
'Harp v. Harp, 314 Ky. 618, 236 S.W. 2d 698 (1951); Hager v. Hager, 309
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marries the man with whom she has been indiscreet, the court will
call it love, and will allow her custody if she can provide the child a
good home. 10 Promiscuity on the mother's part will, of course, destroy
her chances of getting custody.".
In addition to the character and morality of the parents, there are
other considerations to be taken into account by the court. The type
of home into which the child will be taken, the neighborhood, the
type of people with which the child will come into contact in the home,
whether or not the home is crowded, its accessibility to school, the
quality of available school facilities, the home's relative isolation from
urban areas, the social and cultural advantages to be afforded the
child-these are but a few of the considerations. 12 To be sure, none
of the enumerated factors, or others which might be pertinent to a
particular case, will singly have a conclusive effect on the ultimate
award, but a favorable aggregation of factors will certainly help the
parent who has met the character requirements. Of course, the
husband has an additional burden to overcome if a child of tender
years is involved; it is incumbent upon him to show that the physical
environment to be provided by the mother would have a very adverse
effect upon the child, and that the one he can provide will be much
the superior. The mere poverty of the mother will not result in an
award against her, unless it is clearly shown that the conditions would
undesireably influence or affect the child. 13 The court seems to be of
the attitude that a mother's love and devotion will compensate for all
Ky. 803, 219 S.W. 2d 10 (1949); Howard v. Howard, 307 Ky. 452, 211 S.W. 2d

412 (1948).
"0Price v. Price, 306 Ky. 214, 206 S.W. 2d 924 (1947); Birkholz v. Birkholz,
304 Ky. 202, 200 S.W. 2d 294 (1947); Clark v. Clark, 298 Ky. 18, 181 S.W. 2d

397 (1944).
'Smith v. Smith, 242 S.W. 2d 860 (Ky. 1951); Bartley v. Bartley, 310 Ky.

332, 220 S.W. 2d 850 (1949).

"McGill v. Coomer, 309 Ky. 703, 218 S.W. 2d 947 (1949) (bad section of
town); Runge v. Runge, 307 Ky. 752, 212 S.W. 2d 275 (1948) (father's unsettled army life, his parents' home overcrowded); Tufts v. Tufts, 307 Ky. 114,
209 S.W. 2d 821 (1948) (father's home comprised of elderly people); Napier v.
Napier, 303 Ky. 525, 198 S.W. 2d 226 (1946)

(bad atmosphere in which to

rear children); Ragland v. Ragland, 299 Ky. 699, 187 S.W. 2d 257 (1945)
(mother left girl in care of neglectful grandmother in unsavory conditions);
Slusher v. Slusher, 298 Ky. 400, 182 S.W. 2d 972 (1944) (uncomfortable home
of mother with bad influences, good home of father near school); Clark v. Clark,
298 Ky. 18, 181 S.W. 2d 397 (1944) (father engaged in temporary war work
away from his permanent home); Gray v. Gray, 295 Ky. 91, 174 S.W. 2d 16

(1943) (father living with parents of his second wife in four room house);
Hockensmith v. Hockensmith, 286 Ky. 448, 151 S.W. 2d 37 (1941) (no females
in family of father except aged mother).

Ruttencutter v. Ruttencutter, 293 Ky. 556, 169 S.W. 2d 604 (1943); Sowders
v. Sowders, 286 Ky. 269, 150 S.W. 2d 903 (1941); Wacker v. Wacker, 279 Ky.
19, 129 S.W. 2d 1043 (1939).

NoTs AND Com2vms
except positively undesirable physical environmental factors-mere
indigence or inconvenience will not counterbalance the love and care
a mother can offer.' 4 If, however, the mother is physically incapable
of properly caring for her child, custody will be denied her.'3
The court has announced a policy of not separating children of the
same blood by a split custody award except for cause. Where an
older child expresses a desire to live with one parent, the court may
respect its wishes while awarding younger children to the other parent.'0 If the court feels that the influence of an older child will prove
harmful to the development of good character and habits of younger
17
brothers or sisters it will separate them.
The court will approve placement of a child in the hands of near
relatives, usually the grandparents, if it appears that neither parent
is suited to care for it.' There has been but one award of custody
since 1940 which deprived both parents of custody and placed a child
in an institution, 0 although the court indicated in another case that
the chancellor might well have best served the child by placing him in
a children's home.2 0 In the case depriving both parents of custody 2 '
the mother was proved unchaste, and it was shown that the father's
notion of the proper conditions and environment in which to rear a
young girl was not at all proper. The court affirmed the chancellor's
award to a reputable boarding school. The court in a subsequent
appeal indicated that the award would stand so long as it appeared
that the child was happy in the school, and it was not shown the school
was having an adverse effect upon her.2
In making an award when both parents seem reasonably fit, the
23
court will usually allow the child to spend part of the year with each.
In most cases the court will allow the child to spend the school months
" Howard v. Howard, 807 Ky. 452, 211 S.W. 2d 412 (1948).
'Hardman v. Hardman, 308 Ky. 284, 214 S.W. 391 (1948) (mother an
epileptic); Dayton v. Dayton, 290 Ky. 418, 161 S.W. 2d 618 (1942) (mother
suffering from severe nervousness).

"Eckhoff v. Eckhoff, 247 S.W. 2d 374 (Ky. 1952); Stamper v. Stamper, 309
Ky. 161, 216 S.W. 2d 936 (1949); Roberts v. Roberts, 802 Ky. 423, 194 S.W. 2d
1003 (1946).
" Wright v. Thomas, 306 Ky. 763, 209 S.W. 2d 315 (1948); Groslin v. Gibson, 801 Ky. 706, 192 S.W. 2d 962 (1946).

"Cates v. Cates, 314 Ky. 507, 286 S.W. 2d 268 (1951); Mitts v. Mitts, 312
Ky. 854, 229 S.W. 2d 958 (1950); Ray v. Ray, 302 Ky. 788, 196 S.W. 2d 609
(1946); Morris v. Morris, 300 Ky. 159, 188 S.W. 2d 95 (1945); Ragland v.
Ragland, 299 Ky. 699, 187 S.W. 2d 257 (1945); Travis v. Travis, 282 Ky. 215,
138 S.W. 2d 836 (1940).
" Horton v. Horton, 287 Ky. 586, 154 S.W. 2d 550 (1941).
'Tufts v. Tufts, 307 Ky. 114, 209 S.W. 2d 821 (1948).
' Horton v. Horton, 287 Ky. 586, 154 S.W. 2d 550 (1941).
' Horton v. Horton, 294 Ky. 374, 171 S.W. 2d 424 (1943).
"Davis v. Davis, 289 Ky. 618, 159 S.W. 2d 999 (1942).
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with the mother and the vacation months with the father. Reasonable
visitation rights will be reserved in each parent while the child is with
the other. The court treats this right of reasonable visitation as an
absolute right in all parents, regardless of any provision in the divorce
decree, and no matter how undeserving of custody they are.2 4 Where
each parent has seasonal custody, the court may require a bond to be
posted by a parent to insure prompt return of the child.2a Of course,
in any case there is a contempt proceeding facing a tardy parent who
disregards the chancellor's orders.
From the reported cases appearing since 1940, it appears that
Kentucky fits into the general pattern of the law of custody determination. The primary consideration in all cases is the welfare of the child.
This principle has been codified by statute, and by this same statute
it is provided that any custody decree is always before the chancellor
and is subject to modification and revision upon a showing of changed
conditions. 26 Notably lacking in these recent cases is any direct reference to the old common law rule that the father has superior right to
the custody of his children.2 7 As early as 1861 the court termed this
right of the father only a prima facie right which was overcome in the
case of children of tender years by the mother's love and devotion for
her children.2 8 The Kentucky court has for all practical purposes given
the mother a prima facie right to the custody of young children which
can be overcome only by a showing of pronounced unfitness or a clear
inability to provide for them adequately.
It seems that the Kentucky courts have done a commendable job
in most instances. In a few cases it would seem that it might have
been better for the child if some disposition other than custody reposed
in the parents had been made, even to the point of placing him in the
care of a child welfare institution, or any other place away from its
parents. 29 A court would hesitate to make such a decree, especially
when it is not fully aware of all pertinent facts. The appellate court,
with only the written record before it, is reluctant to reverse a chan'Tackett v. Tackett, 302 Ky. 611, 194 S.W. 2d 832 (1946).
314 Ky. 618, 236 S.W. 2d 698 (1951); Birkholz v. Birkhoz,
304 Ky. 202, 200 S.W. 2d 294 (1947).
'Ky. REv. STAT. sec 403.070 (1948); Gray v. Gray, 301 Ky. 381, 192 S.W.
"Harp v. Harp,

2d 102 (1946); Cole v. Cole, 299 Ky. 319, 185 S.W. 2d 382 (1945); Clark v.
Clark, 298 Ky. 18, 181 S.W. 2d 297 (1944).
'Shehan v. Shehan, 152 Ky. 191, 153 S.W. 243 (1913); Rogers v. Rogers,
8 Ky. Opn. 414 (1875); McBride v. McBride, 64 Ky. (1 Bush) 15 (1866).
"Adams v. Adams, 62 Ky. (1 Duval) 168 (1861).
'Moore v. Moore, 307 Ky. 552, 211 S.W. 2d 852 (1948); Tufts v. Tufts,
307 Ky. 114, 209 S.W. 2d 821 (1948); Harms v. Harms, 302 Ky. 60, 193 S.W.
2d 407 (1946); Groslin v. Gibson, 301 Ky. 706, 192 S.W. 2d 962 (1946).
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cellor's decree of custody unless it is clearly erroneous. 30 It feels that
the record may not disclose some intangible factors which might have
influenced the chancellor when he had the parties before him with
their witnesses. In some cases, however, the proceedings before the
chancellor are largely by deposition, in which instance he is not much
better informed than the Court of Appeals, except that he is closer
to the source.
When the rights of children are involved, who is it that will be the
advocate of these rights? Each parent may perhaps believe that he
is the proper guardian and that he will properly protect the welfare
of the child. But parents often become engrossed in the issues of the
divorce itself and lose all perspective of what is best for the- child; or
even worse, each may use the custody issue as a means of retalation
against the other. Can it be that in such an atmosphere the rights of
the children will be adequately represented? The Kentucky Legislature believes not. In 1948 it passed a bill3 l providing that in all counties containing a city of the first or second class the fiscal court may
authorize the judge of that circuit to select a lawyer to act as a "friend
of the court" to insure that the rights of children will be adequately
protected. The friend of the court is authorized, upon request of the
chancellor trying a divorce, to appear in court and represent the rights
of the children. He has the power to make investigations, take depositions and take other steps necessary to learn the facts involved. After
ascertaining the facts he submits a report to the chancellor along with
his recommendations as to what disposition would be best for the welfare of the child. The friend of the court can represent none of the
parties but the children. He is also empowered to see that the custody
decree is carried out and that the person entrusted with custody cares
for the child properly, and that the husband promptly provides for the
child's maintenence.3 2 It is to be noted that the fiscal courts of counties
containing cities of the first or second classes are merely authorized to
create this office and are not required to do so. It would seem that the
seriousness of the divorce-custody problem would warrant a mandatory statute of statewide application along these lines. The powers and
duties of the friend of the court under the present statute appear to
protect adequately the rights of children of divorced parents, but such
an officer should be available to all circuit court judges when they are

Heltsley v. Heltsley, 242 S.W. 2d 973 (Ky. 1941); and see Gilliam v.
Gilliam, 244 S.W. 2d 463 (Ky. 1951).

'Ky. RPmv. STAT. sec. 403.090 (1948).
"2The father is responsible for support of his children regardless of who has

custody. Bowman v. Bowman, 313 Ky. 806, 233 S.W. 2d 1020 (1950).
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hearing a divorce case involving children.3 3 Certainly all the children
in this state who will have their lives affected by a divorce decree
deserve the opportunity to have presented to the court a fair and dispassionate account of all the factors which will have a bearing on
their ultimate custody disposition. Therefore, the "friend of the court"
should be required to investigate all divorce cases affecting children.
Since some counties may not alone be able to bear the financial burden
of hiring a "friend of the court", it might be advisable to allow the
counties in a circuit court district to share the expense, especially
where the divorce docket would not justify a full-time "friend" in all
the counties of the district. In any event the ultimate benefits to be
derived by children of divorced parents and by the state and its coun34
ties might more than offset the expense of the office.
Caims N. CAMs

DIVORCE - DOES RECRIMINATION REMAIN IN KENTUCKY?
In most states the fact that the complainant in an action for
divorce has been guilty of conduct which would constitute a ground
for divorce affords the defendant an adequate defense to the action.1
This defense, referred to as the doctrine of recrimination, is most
simply defined by the oft-repeated statement that if both parties have
a right to a divorce neither has. This principle has often been criticised
as too harsh,2 and as a result, some states have
passed statutes which
3
limit its application in several different ways.
"3 MICH. Com'. LAws sec. 552.251 (1949) provides for a friend of the
court for allcounties who must see that all decrees effecting children are properly
followed, and the chancellor may call upon him to make an investigation and submit recommendations during the original action. 1 ILL. BEv. STAT. c. 28 sec. 438
(1947) allows the chancellor to call upon the County Welfare Department to
make such an investigation.
'For a comprehensive treatment of the problem see Children of Divorced
Parents; A Symposium, 10 LAw ANm CoNTEmP. PROB 697-866 (1944) and see
Cochran, Children of Divorce, 11 Ky. B. J. 201 (1947).
'Brazell v. Brazell, 54 Cal. App. 2d 458. 129 P. 2d 117 (1942); McMillan
v. McMillan, 120 Fla. 209, 162 So. 524 (1935); Smiley v. Smiley, 114 Ind.
App. 138, 51 N.E. 2d 98 (1943); Rigsby v. Rigsby, 266 Ky. 291, 97 S.W.
2d 835 (1936); Boyd v. Boyd, 177 Md. 687, 11 A. 2d 461 (1940); Reddington
v. Reddington, 317 Mass. 760, 59 N.E. 2d 775 (1945); Tebbe v. Tebbe, 223 Mo.
App. 1106, 21 S.W. 2d 915 (1929); Studley v. Studley, 129 Neb. 784, 263 N.W.
139 (1935); Cilente v. Cifente, 104 N.J. Eq. 605, 146 Ad. 469 (1929); Weiger v.
Weiger, 59 N.Y.S. 2d 444 (1946); Phillips v. Phillips, 48 Ohio App. 322, 193
N.E. 657 (1935); Gray v. Gray, 232 Wis. 400, 287 N.W. 708 (1939).
'Note, 36 Ky. L. J. 342.
'For a comparison of statutes of 32 states, see 2 VmmnmR AammucN FNr=y
LAws 82 (1932).

